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Efficient and accurate malware detection is increasingly becoming a necessity for
society to operate. Existing malware detection systems have excellent performance in
identifying known malware for which signatures are available, but poor performance
in anomaly detection for zero day exploits for which signatures have not yet been
made available or targeted attacks against a specific entity. The primary goal of this
thesis is to provide evidence for the potential of learning classifier systems to improve
the accuracy of malware detection.
A customized system based on a state-of-the-art learning classifier system is
presented for adaptive rule-based malware detection, which combines a rule-based
expert system with evolutionary algorithm based reinforcement learning, thus cre-
ating a self-training adaptive malware detection system which dynamically evolves
detection rules.
This system is analyzed on a benchmark of malicious and non-malicious files.
Experimental results show that the system can outperform C4.5, a well-known non-
adaptive machine learning algorithm, under certain conditions. The results demon-
strate the system’s ability to learn effective rules from repeated presentations of a
tagged training set and show the degree of generalization achieved on an independent
test set.
This thesis is an extension and expansion of the work published in the Security,
Trust, and Privacy for Software Applications workshop in COMPSAC 2011 - the 35th
Annual IEEE Signature Conference on Computer Software and Applications [1].
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1. INTRODUCTION
Malicious software (malware) is a program that causes undesired behavior or
damage to a computer system, network, or service. Undesired behavior of software
includes disruption or denial of service, loss of privacy, unauthorized access to re-
sources, and any other hostile or intrusive behavior. Malicious software runs without
the consent of users and often without their knowledge. Malware is an ever-growing
threat to computer systems, and security researchers are in a virtual arms race with
malware authors. The number of different strains and types of malicious software
has been on the rise for years. A recent report states that “in 2010, cyber-criminals
created and distributed a third of all existing viruses”, 34% of all malware that has
ever existed until 2010 was created in those 12 months [2].
Trends in computer usage have led malware authors to create malicious software
on any platform that is profitable. Cybercrime is a multi-million dollar business [3],
and will continue to get larger as more computing devices become available and are
able to get online. As with any other business, internet crime is driven by a return
on investment, and new computing areas will offer criminals new venues of profit.
Once a computer platform has enough users to be worth targeting, criminals will
start attacking that system. Mobile threats are a new category for malware, and as
the smartphone user base grows, so will the malware author base targeting mobile
platforms. In 2010, 163 mobile vulnerabilities were reported [4] and some of the first
trojans and mobile botnets started infecting phones. Attackers are actively seeking
out new areas that can be exploited for profit.
This thesis applies learning classifier systems (LCSs) to malicious software de-
tection. A learning classifier system is a rule-based system that utilizes reinforce-
ment learning combined with evolutionary computing to model an intelligent decision
maker in an arbitrary environment. LCSs are based on Darwinian theories and their
biological-inspired techniques are what makes them adaptable to many environments
and problems.
This thesis presents a blueprint for a benchmarking system for malware de-
tection, using a dataset of malicious and non-malicious files. It describes a feature
2extraction stage of malicious executables as well as introduces a method for training
and testing adaptive learning classifier systems on a dataset representative of a real
computer system. This thesis also contributes a baseline performance analysis of the
C4.5 machine learning algorithm on the dataset for comparison with other techniques.
Most importantly, this work introduces a hybridization of XCS and S-classifiers for
malware detection, adapting it for maximal accuracy and generalization as shown on
the benchmarking dataset.
32. MALICIOUS SOFTWARE
The classification of malware is a difficult problem. Software that allows unau-
thorized control of a system is obviously malicious, but software that displays ads
(adware) is not strictly harmful, unless it invades privacy and collects personal in-
formation without user consent (spyware). Software can be considered malicious
depending on the intent of its author, and this makes it difficult to classify a piece of
code as malicious or not. Research has automated malware detection based on the
intent of the user and the intent of the malware author [5].
Malware comes in various forms and categories, and are classified according to
the methods and techniques employed by the software. While there is overlap between
categories and most malware falls into multiple categories, making a clear distinction
between the different types of malware is useful so the reader has background knowl-
edge on the different kinds of threats detection software must identify.
2.1. COMMON TYPES OF MALWARE
The following list presents common types of malware paraphrasing existing lit-
erature [6, 4, 7, 8].
• Virus - Computer viruses propagate from one file to another and/or from one
computer to another by inserting their code into other programs. Viruses need
an existing host program to execute and cause harm.
• Worm - A worm is a type of virus that spreads to many computer by copying
itself to another computer on the network. Worms typically infect as many
connected systems as possible and unlike viruses, do not need a host in order
to cause damage.
• Trojan horse - Trojans mask themselves by appearing to be something legiti-
mate. Trojans typically destroy data or attempt to extract confidential infor-
mation including financial data and passwords.
4• Spyware - Spyware tracks users’ surfing habits and online information in order
to display targeted ads. Spyware tries to ensure it remains on a system and is
considered an invasion of privacy.
• Rootkits - Rootkits hide traces of themselves from the computer and the user
to evade detection in order to run longer and increase the damage dealt to a
system.
• Scareware - Rogue security software that pretends to be legitimate and cre-
ates false alerts that prompt users to download or purchase malicious software,
sometimes installing the malware it claims to protect against
• Backdoor - A backdoor bypasses normal authentication and security mecha-
nisms to allow access and control of a system.
• Keylogger - A program that stores strokes typed on a keyboard, allowing at-
tackers access to confidential data including passwords and financial data.
In the last few years, malware authors have developed advanced techniques of
spreading their malicious creations. The following list of newer techniques is para-
phrased from existing literature [4, 6, 8].
• Phishing - Sending email that falsely claims to be from a legitimate source in
order to steal personal information.
• Spear Phishing - A type of phishing that targets a group of people that have
something in common, e.g., working at a company or going to the same school,
and utilizes inside information to appear legitimate and from a trusted source
• Targeted attacks - These high profile attacks are typically directed at enterprises
and governmental organizations and are a form of spear phishing that target
specific individuals or groups with privileged access
• Attack kits - These software toolkits are sold by malware creators to common
cyber criminals for widespread use. As opposed to targeted attacks, these pack-
ages infect a website and use multiple attack vectors that work cross-browser
on multiple platforms to exploit as many visitors as possible.
52.2. MALWARE DETECTION
Malware detection is the primary step in preventing a computer system from
potential information loss and system compromise. There are a variety of ways to
detect malicious software. A malware detector attempts to detect malicious behavior
or programs. Detection is the most important step in preventing a computer system
from being infected, protecting it from potential information loss and system com-
promise. There are many methods of detecting malicious software to prevent it from
executing. This section details some of the common techniques and approaches and
their advantages and disadvantages.
The main detection techniques are anomaly-based, signature-based, and specifi-
cation based detection. These techniques are not limited to malware detection, many
of these are applicable to network intrusion detection, fraud detection, and other
fields.
A majority of anti-virus software use signature-based techniques that utilize
a continuously updated set of signatures [9]. This is a reactive technique: until a
signature is created for an exploit, the exploit will elude detection by traditional
anti-virus software.
Anomaly-based techniques detect patterns in data that differ from expected
behavior. Anomalies in data can correspond to important changes in a system. A
computer with an anomalous internet traffic pattern could indicate it has been at-
tacked and is disclosing information [10].
The approach of a malware detection system determines how the information
about a program is gathered and the detection technique determines how that in-
formation is used. The main approaches to malware detection are static analysis,
dynamic analysis, and a hybrid of the two.
Static analysis uses structural and syntactical information of a program to de-
termine its maliciousness. Before a program is executed, static information found in
the executable, including header data and the sequences of bytes, is used to determine
whether it is malicious. Static analysis is able to analyze all possible paths a program
may take at run time, but usually not every possible state of the program as there are
an arbitrary number of user inputs and states [11]. Static analysis uses an abstracted
model of program that approximates the actual behavior [11]. Static analysis can be
time consuming, especially with obfuscated code.
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stack to detect malware during or after its execution [8]. Dynamic analysis does not
use abstraction, it analyses actual run-time behavior of a program. Dynamic analysis
analyses a single execution path of an executable and multiple runs using different
sets of inputs will cover additional code paths. There is no guarantee, however, that
all possible behaviors of an executable are covered by a set of inputs. The main
challenge of static analysis is creating a good abstraction of the program and the
primary challenge of dynamic analysis is creating a representative set of inputs to the
program [11].
2.2.1. Anomaly-based detection. Anomaly-based detection techniques
compare a program’s behavior to what is considered normal behavior in order to
evaluate whether or not a program is malicious. This technique has two phases, a
learning, or training, phase and a detection, or monitoring, phase. During the learning
phase, a profile of normal and acceptable behavior is learned by the detection system.
During the detection phase, this learned profile is applied to actual activity in order
to detect deviations (anomalies).
A major advantage of an anomaly-based technique is the ability to detect zero-
day attacks which the system has never seen before. The disadvantages of anomaly-
based detection techniques are a high false alarm rate and the difficulty of determining
what type of features the system should learn during the training phase [8]. A pri-
mary challenge in detecting anomalies is defining acceptable behavior, which includes
every possible normal behavior, and creates a precise boundary between normal and
anomalous activity. Behavior that lies close to this boundary has a higher chance of
being incorrectly classified.
Dynamic anomaly-based detection uses information gathered during a program’s
execution. The detection phase identifies malicious behavior by comparing it with
learned behavior. Dynamic techniques execute malicious programs on the system.
Static anomaly-based detection looks at the file structure of the program and
uses its characteristics to determine if it contains malicious code. An advantage of
static anomaly-based detection is that malware can be detected without having to
execute it [8].
Rule-based anomaly detection techniques learn rules during the training phase
that capture the normal behavior of a system. Any behavior that is not covered by
7the rules is considered to be an anomaly. Association rule mining-based techniques
have been used for network intrusion detection, system call intrusion detection, and
credit card fraud detection [10].
In an ideal situation, the set of anomalous activities would be the same set
as malicious activities. If this were the case, computer security would be an easy
problem to solve; however, in reality systems encounter false negatives, behavior that
is not anomalous but is malicious, and false positives, behavior that is anomalous
but not malicious. While training anomaly thresholds can be set low to minimize
false negatives, this will increase the amount of false positives. The training profile is
only an approximation of all valid behaviors and valid behaviors not seen during the
training would cause false negatives [8].
2.2.2. Specification-based detection. Specification-based techniques
are similar to anomaly-based techniques, but differ in the source of the acceptable
behavior. While anomaly-based systems typically develop normal profiles of systems
using automatic training, in specification-based detection, security specifications are
manually created for correct behavior of critical objects. Programs that violate these
specifications are anomalous, and unknown attacks can be detected.
Specification detection differs from anomaly detection by approximating the re-
quirements of a system instead of approximating an implementation of one. Training
a system specifies all valid behaviors of that system. A main challenge of specification-
based techniques is completely and accurately specifying the entire set of acceptable
behaviors, as any inaccuracies result in incorrect detection.
An example hybrid specification approach combines static with dynamic analysis
to analyze system calls [12]. During static analysis, information is saved about every
system call which includes its 1) call address, 2) name, and 3) return address. During
dynamic analysis, executables are monitored during run-time to ensure each system
call matches the list from static analysis. If a process was modified during run-time,
e.g., it was injected by a malicious process, then the three pieces of information will
have changed and the behavior will be detected.
2.2.3. Signature-based detection. In signature-based detection schemes,
the system attempts to model the malicious behavior of programs and compares each
program to the signatures. The collection of signatures represents all the knowledge
8the system has about how malicious programs behave and this collection is used to
make a decision on the maliciousness of a program. For a program to be detected
as malicious it must match a signature known by the detection system. Signatures
must be updated when a new piece of malware is found; the system has to be con-
stantly checked to ensure it is up-to-date. This creates a problem when a zero-day
attack emerges, as it takes time to create and push out a signature and the system is
vulnerable during this time. The quicker signatures can be created, the better they
can protect against malware that spreads quickly throughout the internet. There has
been some research into automated signature builders, but they are not as advanced
as humans [8].
The primary drawback of signature-based detection is the set of possible ma-
licious behaviors is infinitely large, and there are no known techniques that can ac-
curately represent the entire set. As new malicious behaviors are found, signatures
have to be created in order to stay up-to-date. New malware is often derived from
existing malware, and signatures can take advantage of this fact if they are created in
such a way that captures the malicious essence of the malware; benefits of this would
include that a smaller number of signatures would be as effective, and the ability to
detect obfuscated versions of the same malware.
93. RELATED WORK
Recent research has shown that existing anti-virus software is poor at identify-
ing polymorphic scripts [13]. By using various polymorphic techniques, the authors
were able to create malicious scripts with identical functionality to known malware
that were undetectable by existing anti-virus software. They were able to detect the
malware variants by analyzing the software’s dependency graph with a hybrid ge-
netic algorithm. Simple polymorphism could fool more than half of the software that
detected the original malware.
There have been approaches to malware detection that use non-signature based
techniques. By extracting features of portable executable (PE) files, malicious exe-
cutables can be detected by heuristic techniques [9]. Packed and non-packed files were
processed separately by a decision tree to determine whether they are maliciousness.
To determine whether a binary is packed, three features were looked at: (1) the name,
number and type of sections, (2) the number of entries in the import address table,
and (3) the entropies of various portions of an executable. Different structural models
were developed for packed and non-packed executables. This technique was shown to
overcome a bias shown by structural features for packed/non-packed executables by
using two models: the non-packed model uses a subset of features for non-packed files
which contain the most information, and the packed model uses a subset of features
which are least perturbed by packing.
A comparative study analyzed evolutionary and non-evolutionary rule learning
algorithms to evaluate performance differences [14]. Five types of LCS were com-
pared with five non-evolutionary rule learners. Four performance metrics were used
to compare the algorithms: (1) classification accuracy, (2) the number of rules, (3)
comprehensibility of the rules, and (4) processing overhead. All algorithm implemen-
tations were provided by a unified framework called Knowledge Extraction based on
Evolutionary Learning (KEEL). The rules were built from 189 features extracted from
the files, but examples of features were not provided and an unknown number of fea-
tures were determined to be redundant. Each algorithm was run on a subset of 10,339
malicious executables. The total malicious set of executables was divided into cate-
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gories such as backdoor, virus, or trojan. The size of each subset ranged from a few
hundred files to 2500, with the average below 1500 executables. The ratio of training
set size to test set size was 9:1, so each category has a test set of only a few hundred
files. The reported classification accuracy for all algorithms was above 95 percent.
Their conclusions indicated that the non-evolutionary rule learning algorithms out-
performed the LCS types. The LCS types still had very high detection rates, but at
the expense of high processing time. The authors acknowledged that they did not
explore different configuration parameters for the rule learning algorithms, as well as
a plan to combine the datasets into a single large set in order to create a more chal-
lenging environment. Limiting the sets to a specific category of malware increases the
chances of similarity between files, providing for an easier environment than a random
collection of malware; this narrow result led to artificially high accuracy rates which
are most likely not representative of real world performance.
A fuzzy learning classifier system was applied to intrusion detection in [15]. The
system automatically generated a detection model that could detect known attacks
and variations on known attacks by using a fuzzy learning classifier system. Results
were presented on a benchmark dataset and compared with the C4.5 classification
algorithm. The system evolved fuzzy classification rules for effective intrusion de-
tection by optimizing membership functions using an evolutionary algorithm. The
fuzzy rules were constructed based on the C4.5 rules and compared to the standard
C4.5 approach. Each individual in the population consisted of membership functions
related to input variables from a dataset of intrusions. Four different input variables
were used in the individual representation: duration, source bytes, destination bytes
and a measurement of the number of “hot” indicators. These input variables contain
a total of 66 real-valued attributes that were fuzzified for use in the fuzzy learning
classifier system. Two separate experiments were carried out, the first constructed
fuzzy rules based on the C4.5 rules. Fuzzy rules were created using a genetic algo-
rithm and had a significant improvement over the original rules. An implementation
of a fuzzy learning classifier was then applied to the dataset and resulted in a slight
improvement of the rules.
A Genetically Programmed Learning Classifier System was used in [16] and was
originally designed to be an intelligent agent used to support the maintenance of the
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Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. The system was able to learn to optimize its results of
tasks including inventory purchase, and mobile agent functionality. The system used
genetic programing for representation and used a full bucket-brigade fitness passing
approach for learning and reinforcement. Crowding helps maintain diversity of the
population by comparing children to similar adults and replacing the least fit adult
with the new child. The system design was similar to the classic learning classifier




The dataset for this research consisted of malicious executables as well as non-
malicious ones. Malicious software samples were obtained from Offensive Comput-
ing [17]. Non-malicious software samples were obtained from a machine freshly in-
stalled with Windows XP and a university campus computer learning center machine
running Windows XP. Clean executables included software created by Microsoft,
Adobe, MathWorks, other third parties, and open source software.
A primary assumption this thesis makes is that malicious files will be distin-
guishable from goodware based upon the structure of the PE file including section
names and entropies as well as the import address table. While in the real world
this assumption would not always hold, for the purpose of this research, this is an
acceptable assumption for determining whether an LCS can potentially be used for
malware detection.
Windows executables, both malicious and non-malicious, are written in the
portable executable (PE) format. PE files start with a DOS header, followed by a PE
header, and contain a number of sections. Each section has a header which describes
its data and resources. A typical Windows application has nine predefined sections:
.text, .bss, .rdata, .data, .rsrc, .edata, .idata, .pdata, and .debug [18]. Each section
has a different purpose, for example .text is used to store program code while .data
is used for global variables.
One important section is the import data section which contains the Import
Address Table (IAT). The IAT is where every external function called by an executable
is stored. This table includes the name of the function and the name of the dynamic
link library (DLL) in which the function is stored.
Different types of files contain a variety of imports, and the number of imports
a file includes depends on its purpose. For example, kernel32.dll is a common dy-
namic link library which provides functionality to all of the fundamental Windows
application programming interfaces. This includes access to memory management,
13
Figure 4.1: Pre-processing stage
file system input/output, process and thread creation, and error handling. Many
user programs import functions from kernel32.dll to provide basic functionality. ker-
nel32.dll itself imports these functions from the native API DLL ntdll.dll, and has
391 imported functions. This high of a number of imports is uncommon for most
executable files, but is not so uncommon for DLLs.
4.2. PRE-PROCESSING
An overview of the pre-processing method is shown in Figure 4.1. This stage
takes each file from the dataset and passes it through VirusTotal to determine its
maliciousness, and then extracts a set of features from the file.
4.2.1. VirusTotal. VirusTotal [19] is a online web site that offers a free
analysis of files. It is an independent service that runs multiple anti-virus engines on
each file to identify viruses, worms, trojans and other malicious software. VirusTotal
maintains an updated version of each anti-virus engine to ensure they include the
latest virus signatures. At the time of this writing, 43 different anti-virus engines
were in use.
Each executable file used in this research was submitted through VirusTotal’s
API for analysis. The result from VirusTotal was used as the ground truth in deciding
whether or a not a file was considered malicious or not.
The set of samples from Offensive Computing does not contain just malware. If
more than 25 percent of the anti-virus vendors VirusTotal uses to scan a file report
malicious, then the file is considered malicious. This eliminates the possibility of a
single anti-virus software misclassifying a file. Each file was checked to make sure that
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Figure 4.2: Sample output from VirusTotal
VirusTotal is consistent with the dataset the file came from; i.e., a sample from the
malware set must be identified as malicious and a sample from the goodware set as
non-malicious. If it is not consistent, the sample is considered unknown. Furthermore,
all samples (malicious or not) that are not in VirusTotal’s database are also considered
unknown. All unknown samples are not used in the results presented in this thesis,
as they cannot be verified as being definitely malware or goodware.
An example of a file submitted through VirusTotal’s web interface is shown in
Figure 4.2. The results from a selection of the anti-virus engines are shown for one
of the pieces of malware used in this research. During preprocessing, if these results
indicate a file is malicious, it is marked as such in the dataset.
4.2.2. Feature Extraction. Feature extraction takes features and char-
acteristics of the executables and turns the information into a format used by the
LCS. The IAT from each executable is parsed to generate a feature list containing
all of the imported functions each executable references. The list of sections is also
extracted, along with their sizes and entropies. The feature extractor implemented
using an open source tool called pefile [20].
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Figure 4.3: Number of imports per file
Details of the full dataset and extracted features are as follows:
• 6,774 total files
• 3,401 malicious files
• 3,373 non-malicious files from Windows XP
• 58,584 total unique imports
• 703 total unique sections
A graph of the number of imports per malicious and non-malicious file is shown
in Figure 4.3. An interesting note is how many malicious files have a low number of
imports, and the most common number of imports for clean files is much higher than
that of malicious files.
Looking at the most common imported functions, Figure 4.4 shows the number
of malicious and number of clean files that imported each function. All but one of
these functions exist in kernel32.dll, the fourth most popular came from advapi32.dll
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Figure 4.4: Most common imports
which provides access to advanced services of Windows, including the registry. The
most popular imports were split about 50-50 in the number of goodware and mal-
ware files that use those functions. One outlier was kernel32.dll.ExitProcess(), this
function was imported more by malicious files than clean ones.
4.2.3. Executable Packing. Executable packing is a form of compression
and/or encryption of executable files, and the programs that perform the compression
are known as packers. Compression programs are utilized to minimize disk space
usage as well as network transfer times. Traditional programs like WinZip compress
files into a separate archive which must be extracted to disk to retrieve the original
files. Packers compress an original program into a new executable and add a stub
function which will unpack (decompresses and decrypt) the original executable into
memory. A packed executable runs without having to be separately extracted, unlike
.zip files. This process obscures the original file and makes it more difficult to reverse
engineer. One of the most common packers is the Ultimate Packer for eXecutables
(UPX). UPX is a free and open source executable compression tool that can be used
on Windows binaries as well as other platforms. UPX by itself is not malicious, but
many types of files including malware are packed using it.
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When malware is packed, the size of the file is decreased, but more importantly
the signature of the file changes and this makes it more difficult for anti-virus soft-
ware to detect. Two potential downsides to packing are the additional computation
overhead at run-time to unpack the original and the fact that the packing process
creates a signature which can be detected [21]. All packers have the same weakness:
they must unpack the original executable into memory in order to execute it; they
can not stop analysis of a file, they can only make it more costly [21].
Around 90%, of malware samples use some form of packing [22]. Popular packers
(ASpack, FSG, Morphine, UPX, MEW) are detected by most anti-virus software, but
many of the less common ones have very poor detection rates [22]. By using multiple
packers on the same family of malware, malware authors can evade detection for longer
periods of time. Some scanners incorrectly flag packed but legitimate executables as
malicious or suspicious. There are advanced packers that make analysis harder, by
including routines to make memory debugging and dumping more difficult, and not
all anti-virus products account for the various types of packers.
4.2.4. Entropy. Entropy in information theory is a measure of uncertainty
in a series of bytes [23]. Similar to how sentences are not random sequence of letters,
Windows executables are not random sequence of bytes, and the entropy of a block
of data is a measurement of uncertainty in those bytes. Having a high entropy does
not imply randomness; compression creates a high level of entropy but leaves data
highly structured [24]. Compressed and encrypted data will look very similar from
an entropy point of view.
In binary files, entropy can be calculated by counting the number of times





p(xi) log2 p(xi) (1)
where p is the probability mass function of x and p(xi) is the probability of the ith
unit of information. One byte contains 8 bits and there are 28 = 256 possible values
(00h - FFh). The unit of entropy in Equation 1 is the bit, and entropy ranges from
0.0− 8.0 for a sequence of bytes.
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Analysis of different types of executables, including native windows executables,
packed executables, and encrypted executables, resulted in different levels of entropy
for each file type [24]. The results show that executables with an average entropy of
6.677 or greater are statistically likely to be packed or encrypted. Malware authors
can conceal encryption or compression by adding in redundant bytes or including
invalid blocks or blocks with all zero values to lower a binary’s entropy. Malware
executables that exceed this average entropy are considered to be packed.
Each PE file contains a number of sections that the operating system loads,
some contain data and some contain executable code. Malware can make analysis
more difficult by using nonstandard sections and renaming them. All of the malware
samples in this research were analyzed in a pre-processing stage. During this analysis,
each section of each file was analyzed for its name, size, and entropy. Figure 4.5 shows
the top 11 PE sections in the data set, shown by the total number of sections used
in malicious and non-malicious files. Eight of the sections are generated by standard
compilers and linkers and they are: .rsrc, .data, .text, .reloc, .rdata, .idata, .bss, and
.edata. Of the remaining three sections, UPX0, UPX1 are generated by the UPX
packer and the third section’s name contained a string of the unprintable byte ‘\x00’
and is not a standard name section. Malware may create a non-ASCII or random
name of a section to obfuscate its purpose.
From the set of clean files, 108 unique section names were found, and 622 dif-
ferent section names were found in the set of malicious files. The large difference is
due to malware creating non-standard names to make analysis more difficult. Sec-
tions that have a size 0 are uninitialized initially and when the program is run and
copied into memory, these 0-byte sections could get filled with data or unpacked code.
Ignoring empty sections, 26.4% of all the malicious sections in the dataset were de-
termined to be packed; and 2.4% of the non-malicious sections. Each file contains
multiple sections, and 69.2% of malicious files contained at least one section that was
determined to be compressed or encrypted, while 10.2% of non-malicious files had
one or more packed sections. Malicious programmers are more likely to pack their
executables, as it saves network transfer time and disk space and some packers make
it more difficult for anti-virus software to detect and reverse engineer.
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Figure 4.5: Number of PE sections
Different packers compress their data into different sections, some use the default
ones, and others create their own sections (as shown by UPX). Figure 4.6 shows the
most popular sections that contained data with high entropy and are most likely
packed. The most popular packed section was UPX1, which is the section UPX use
to store the compressed data of the original executable. A small amount of non-
malicious files had packed UPX1 sections. As mentioned earlier, UPX is not only
used maliciously, it also has legitimate uses. Seven clean third-party executables
were packed using UPX including gpg.exe - Gnu Privacy Guard, a file and email
encryption tool and winscp.exe - an open source SFTP and FTP client for Windows.
There are legitimate programs that use packing tools, but they are in the minority,
and no Windows files were found to be packed.
The other top packed sections include default ones, the string of ‘\x00’, and
UPX2. Interestingly, the only packed section that more non-malicious files contained
than malicious was .reloc. The .reloc section holds a table of base relocations, which
are adjustments to an instruction if the loader cannot find a file. The relocation data
in this section inherently has a high entropy, and is not necessarily the product of a
packer. The UPX0 section seen in Figure 4.5 is the section that UPX uses to unpack
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Figure 4.6: Number of high-entropy PE sections
Table 4.1: PE file errors preventing feature extraction
pe instance has no attribute ’directory entry import’
invalid nt headers signature.
no optional header found, invalid pe32 or pe32+ file
data at rva can’t be fetched. corrupt header?
data length less than expected header length.
invalid e lfanew value, probably not a pe file
the original executable into memory, it initially starts empty on disk and therefore
has a entropy of 0, so it does not appear in Figure 4.6.
Files with corrupt or missing IATs could not be analyzed in this system, Ta-
ble 4.1 lists all encountered PE errors reported by pefile. 847 files were found to be
incompatible for feature extraction. These files could be malicious executables that
have been purposely modified by their authors to change the content of their PE
header in order to make analysis harder.
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4.3. FILTERING THE DATASET
Occasionally, a malicious file has an identical set of features as a non-malicious
file. Any detection system would inherently not be able to tell the difference between
files with identical features. These files were removed from the dataset to increase
the usefulness of the evolved rules. Files with corrupt or missing IATs could not be
analyzed in this system. Extracting additional features would improve the number of
files that could be used in the system; these features are discussed in the future work
section.
As described earlier, many malicious programs are packed, and building a system
to identify packed files is trivial as they have a much different structure than unpacked
files. A detector that can identify packed files may do reasonably well as a malware
detector, considering many malware samples are packed, and not many goodware
files are packed. It is also easy to separate .dll files from regular .exe executables, and
although link libraries are written in the same format, they are not directly executable
themselves but provide functionality to other programs. The dataset was hardened
by removing packed executables, as well as clean files such as link libraries that were
not .exes. This subset of files is more difficult to distinguish, as the features have
more in common. The details of the unpacked and filtered dataset are as follows:
• 854 malicious files
• 1,048 non-malicious files
• 18,804 unique imports
• 126 unique sections
There are two types of noise that classification and data mining problems can
have [25]. The first type, known as classification noise, makes it impossible for the
system to develop to achieve 100% testing accuracy; the predictive attributes of the
training set do not allow perfect prediction of the test set. The second type of noise,
attribute noise, are attributes within the problem domain that aren’t useful in the
system’s prediction, they have no relationship to class. These attributes are known
as non-predictive attributes. In certain problems the distinction between predictive
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and non-predictive attributes is a goal of the system, and noise in the dataset is a
common and important problem [25].
4.4. C4.5 DECISION TREE ALGORITHM
C4.5 is a machine learning decision tree algorithm first introduced in [26]. It
is known as a statistical classifier as it uses the statistics of a population of data
to generates a decision tree. Through supervised learning, C4.5 takes a training set
of data with individuals of known classes and separates them into groups based on
quantitative information taken from their traits and characteristics. C4.5 chooses
each node of the decision tree based on what attribute most effectively split the data
into class subsets.
Decision trees are built using a statistical property called information entropy.
It uses entropy as the basis for its choices, using the difference in entropy (information
gain). Information gain is a measurement of how well a feature separates training
instances into target classes. The tree building process favors features which distinctly
separate class members. A leaf in a decision tree indicates a class, and a decision node
specifies a test to perform on a single attribute. Each outcome from the test branches
to its own subtree. An example subtree of a decision created on the dataset used in
this research is shown in Figure 4.7.
C4.5 has been shown to be outperformed by a genetic algorithm batch-incremental
concept Learner on a 6-input multiplexer problem [27]. The problem had 6 features
and each feature had 2 possible values, for a total of 64 problem instances repre-
sented by 12-bit strings. Multiplexer problems describe a k-input boolean function
from input/output examples, but any single input line is not helpful in determining
class membership [27]. The poor performance of C4.5 in this test was not attributed
to using a decision tree for its representation, but to an information theoretic search
bias [27]. This bias is created by the classification description and representation of
the problem as well as the search algorithm.
4.5. C4.5 BENCHMARKING RESULTS
For a baseline comparison, C4.5 was run on the benchmarking dataset. This
was implemented in the open-source data mining and machine learning suite called
orange [28].
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Figure 4.7: Portion of a decision tree created using C4.5
To determine how C4.5 performs on different size datasets, multiple runs of
varying sizes were studied. One limitation of the C4.5 implementation in the orange
framework was the size of the dataset it was able to analyze. When using large
datasets, the number of features grew into the tens of thousands and C4.5 crashed
while being run; this limitation could be a feature dimension memory constraint or a
limit of the framework used.
One benefit of C4.5 is that it has a low computation time. After being given a
problem description, C4.5 does not take long to generate a decision tree. Generating
the problem description turned out to be a much longer task than the running of
the algorithm. C4.5 is dependent on having a complete description of all problem
instances and features. Each dataset must be organized into a table format describing
all instances and attributes. Generating a table with hundreds of rows (problem
instances) multiplied by tens of thousands of columns (features) is not a trivial task.
Each run is averaged over a 10-fold cross-validation test, and therefore ten training
and ten test tables were generated for each run. The amount of time required to
generate the descriptions C4.5 uses to build trees offsets the small run-time of the
algorithm itself.
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Figure 4.8: C4.5 Results
Results from using smaller datasets are presented in Figure 4.8. As the dataset
size increases, the number of leaf nodes increases as well. More attribute values are
required to split larger datasets. Larger datasets include a higher number of training
features and they create a larger space to search through, thus the need for larger
decision trees. The testing accuracy of C4.5 ranged from 75.0% on a dataset of 100
files to 85.0% on a dataset of 600 files.
C4.5 is a non-adaptive technique, and its ability to classify files does not improve
over time. In order to run on different size datasets, C4.5 requires a complete de-
scription of the training dataset and attribute list. It is a batch learner and if a single
new problem instance is added, the description must be re-calculated and C4.5 starts
over from scratch. Adaptive techniques, on the other hand, are able to continuously
improve their results as they learn a dataset. If an adaptive learning algorithm was
used, specifically an incremental learner, adding a new problem instance would not
require starting the algorithm over from scratch.
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C4.5 was not able to parse large datasets, and table generation required a much
larger amount of time than the algorithm itself took to run. C4.5 cannot reach optimal
performance on the tests of the benchmark dataset. These results indicate C4.5 is
not optimal for running on sparse datasets with lots of attributes. These drawbacks
of C4.5 warrant an investigation of adaptive machine learning techniques that may
be able to outperform C4.5.
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5. EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTING
Learning classifier systems are adaptive machine learning systems from the field
of evolutionary computing. They combine aspects of computer science and biology.
Evolutionary computing draws inspiration from natural processes such as the Dar-
winist theory of natural selection. On a computer, evolutionary processes can be
simulated at speeds thousands of times faster than real-time. Evolutionary computa-
tion applies Darwin’s survival of the fittest principle to a population of individuals.
Evolutionary computing techniques search a problem space by evolving solutions that
become better over time, as they adapt to the problem.
Recent advances in technology have created a demand for automatic problem-
solving as well as an increase in the complexity of problems humans are trying to
solve. Algorithm design can not keep up, and there is a need for general algorithms
that can be applied to a wide range of problems and still deliver acceptable, but
not necessarily optimal, solutions. Evolutionary computing can fulfill this need by
providing automated solutions with acceptable solutions in less time than developing
a tailored algorithm design.
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) drive the field of evolutionary computing. EAs
act on a population of individuals, each of which represents a solution to the prob-
lem, and by appling environmental pressures, they simulate the biological process of
natural selection and the overall fitness of the population is increased. A general
evolutionary algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 General evolutionary algorithm process
Initialize the population with randomly-generated candidate solutions
Evaluate the fitness of each individual
while termination condition is unmet do
1. Competitive selection of parents based on fitness
2. Apply genetic operators to parents to create offspring
3. Evaluate the fitness of the offspring
4. Remove some of the least-fit individuals from the population
end while
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Figure 5.1: Evolution Cycle
Each generation chooses a selection of individuals to reproduce, promoting genes
that represent a better solution. This determination is based on an evaluation func-
tion, called the fitness function, that grades each individual. The initial random
population is graded on a fitness measure and parents are selected based on fitness.
The stochastic processes of mutation and recombination to genes of parents creates
children with the goal of creating individuals with a higher fitness, thus moving the
population closer to an optimal solution to the problem. The new candidates compete
with existing ones for a place in the next generation. A visual overview of the process
is presented in Figure 5.1.
5.1. EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHM COMPONENTS
Biological processes in nature influence individuals to become better adapted
to an environment and those that survive long enough to reproduce pass on their
genes, slowing evolving the entire population. There are many components of nature
that contribute to these biological mechanisms, and EAs simulate many of these
components. Each one contributes to how the algorithm runs.
5.1.1. Representation. The definition of an individual represents how
it forms a possible solution to a problem. This maps the original problem onto a
problem landscape that can be searched by the EA. The problem space is encoded
into a space that can be represented by genes, which is where the evolutionary search
takes place.
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5.1.2. Fitness function. The fitness function (evaluation function) of an
EA estimates a solution’s quality. It guides the evolution process as the EA uses this
measure for selection and determination of which solutions are considered better. As
fitness is evaluated many times during evolution, an ideal function is closely mapped
to the algorithm’s goal and can be computed quickly.
5.1.3. Population. EAs process a collection of potential solutions. Individ-
uals themselves do not evolve, the population as a whole does as better individuals
are inserted and poorer ones are removed.
5.1.4. Parent selection. Parent selection chooses individuals to reproduce
and pass on their genetic encodings of a solution. The selection is probabilistic to
promote fitter individuals. Parent selection is responsible for improving the quality
of the population.
5.1.5. Recombination. Recombination mixes information (genes) from
two solutions into new ones. The parts from each parent to combine are chosen
stochastically. The goal of and recombination is to combine desirable features from
two individuals into a single child.
5.1.6. Mutation. Mutation in an EA slightly modifies an individual to create
a mutant, much like a mutation in biology. Mutation causes a random, unbiased
change in the genes of a solution.
5.1.7. Survivor selection. Survivor selection is similar to parent selection,
as it chooses individuals based on their fitness, but is used after offspring have been
created. The population size is generally static and survivors are selected to move on
to the next generation.
5.1.8. Initialization. Initialization in an EA is generally done by random
generation, but problem-specific heuristics can be used to try and create a higher
fitness initial population.
5.1.9. Termination. An EA runs until a termination criterion is met.
Common options are a length of time, fitness evaluations, or fitness stops improving.
5.2. GENETIC PROGRAMMING
Genetic Programming is an evolutionary computation (EC) technique that searches
for computer programs solve a described problem. This automated problem solving
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Figure 5.2: Genetic programming tree representation
method takes a high-level statement of the problem and does not require the user to
specify the structure of the solution.
Genetic programming differs from other forms of evolutionary computation by
using different forms of representation, initialization, genetic operators, and fitness
evaluation.
5.2.1. Representation. In genetic programming, individuals are normally
expressed as syntax trees, not lines of code. The variables and constants of a program
are the leaves of the tree (known as terminals) and arithmetic operations are the
internal nodes (functions). The set of terminals and functions make up the primitive
set of a genetic program. An example representation is shown in Figure 5.2 which
corresponds to the equation: (3.5 ∗ (X− 8))/(4 + sin(Y)).
5.2.2. Initialization. In genetic programming, two common initialization
methods are grow and full. In both methods individuals are created so they do not
exceed a specified maximum depth. Depth of a node is measured by counting the
number of edges it takes to traverse to the node starting from the root node. The full
method creates by randomly selecting nodes from the function set until the maximum
depth is reached, then terminals are randomly selected. Each tree is full and all leaves
are at the maximum depth. The grow method creates trees of varying size and shape.
Nodes are selected from the full primitive set, unless maximum depth is reached,
when only terminals can be selected.
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5.2.3. Recombination. Recombination in GP differs from other evolution-
ary algorithms, the most common method is subtree crossover. In subtree crossover,
a crossover point is randomly selected in two parents and the offspring is created
by replacing the subtree rooted at the first parent’s crossover point with the subtree
rooted at the second parent’s crossover point.
5.2.4. Mutation. The most common form of mutation in genetic program-
ming is known as subtree mutation. This method randomly chooses a mutation point
in an individual’s tree and replaces the subtree rooted at that node with a randomly
generated subtree. Another mutation method, known as point mutation, selects a
random node and replaces the primitive with a random primitive of the same arity.
This is genetic programming’s equivalent of the bit-flip mutation used in genetic algo-
rithms. Subtree mutation replaces exactly one subtree, while point mutation happens
on each node with a specified probability, allowing multiple nodes to be mutated.
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6. LEARNING CLASSIFIER SYSTEMS
Learning classifier systems combine reinforcement learning (RL) with evolution-
ary algorithms to create a rule-based expert system. The earliest learning classifier
system concept was introduced by John Holland in 1976 [29] and was an expansion on
his earlier invention, the genetic algorithm (GA) [30]. Holland expanded his frame-
work into what became the standard learning classifier system. But this system was
too complex to realize the intended behavior/performance [31], and Wilson created
additional classifier systems which kept the original framework from Holland but sim-
plified it to increase its performance. These new systems are discussed later in this
section.
The basic framework of an LCS consists of (1) a finite population of classifiers
that represents the current knowledge of the system, (2) a performance component,
which regulates interaction between the environment and classifier population, (3)
a reinforcement component, which distributes the reward received from the environ-
ment to the classifiers and is the learning mechanism, and (4) a discovery component
which employs an EA to evolve better rules [32]. Each rule is in the form of “IF
condition THEN action”, and when the information from the environment matches
its condition, the rule is used in the decision making process. The condition of a rule
encodes when the rule is applicable to the environment and the action of a rule tells
the system what action to perform.
LCSs can be applied to different problem domains including optimization prob-
lems, classification problems, and RL problems [33]. Optimization problems are
solved by searching a solution space for the best solution. One issue with optimiza-
tion problems is when there are local optimums, the fitness function may mislead an
algorithm away from the global optimum. In a classification problem, the LCS learns
to which class each problem instance belongs. Feedback is immediate and problem
instances can be sampled independently. Contrary to classification problems, feed-
back in RL problems provides an indication of the quality of an action and may not
be immediate. RL problem instances may be dependent on each other, as subsequent
input depends on previous input and chosen actions [33]. Classification problems can
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be redefined as single-step RL problems where reward is immediate. Multi-step RL
problems have delayed reward that propagates backwards. Malware detection is a
boolean classification problem, where each problem instance (a file) can be classified
as one of two classes (malicious or non-malicious). This classification problem can
be learned by an LCS when converted into a single-step RL problem. A classifica-
tion learning system’s goals are to have a high percentage of correct classifications
(accuracy) while being able to classify unseen problem instances (generality) [33].
6.1. DISCOVERY
As described earlier, evolutionary algorithms or genetic algorithms drive the
discovery mechanism of a LCS. New rules are created in hopes of being rewarded
with a higher payoff than that of their parents. The EA in an LCS operates on a
population of rules or rulesets, each of which represents a solution to the problem.
The condition of each rule is encoded in its genotype and the solution is represented
by the action of the rule. The evolutionary algorithm operates on individuals, mixing
their genes by recombination and mutation. This process allows for new rules to enter
the population and compete in natural selection.
6.2. LEARNING
In the field of artificial intelligence, learning is defined as the improvement in
performance by acquiring knowledge through experience [32]. Reinforcement learning
drives the evolutionary component of the LCS. In reinforcement learning, a learning
system attempts to maximize reward by learning through trial and error. This ap-
proach is similar to animal learning theory, where secondary reinforces cause animals
to associate external stimuli with food or pain [31].
Along with a condition and action, each rule has values associated with its
fitness. The environment provides a numerical reward which guides the learning pro-
cess. As the environment distributes reward, iterative updates to fitness parameters
drive the LCS learning mechanism. Reinforcement learning serves two purposes: to
promote individuals that obtain high rewards and to help discover better rules [32].
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6.3. MICHIGAN AND PITTSBURGH STYLE LCS
After Holland first introduced the LCS, that style became known as a Michigan-
style LCS [32]. The evolutionary algorithm operates on the individual level and the
entire population of rules represents a solution. An alternate LCS implementation
was introduced and became known as Pittsburgh-style [34]. In this type of LCS, a
population consists of variable length rule sets. Each rule set is a potential solution
instead of each individual. The EA operates on the level of an entire rule set in a
Pittsburgh-style LCS.
Each style of LCS is best applied to a certain type of learning. Pittsburgh style
LCSs are usually applied in “offline” or batch learning scenarios, where all training
problems are presented simultaneously to the learner which results in a rule set that
does not change over time [33, 32]. Michigan style LCSs are designed to work “online”,
incrementally learning each problem instance individually and evolving the rule set
over time with each new observation. Offline learning is characteristic of data mining
problems. This research uses a Michigan style LCS to continuously evolve a malware
classifier.
6.4. OVERGENERAL CLASSIFIER PROBLEM
The concept of strong overgenerals in learning classifier systems is discussed
in [35]. Two problems faced by learning classifier systems are overgeneral rules and
greedy classifiers. A general classifier has a condition that matches many problem
instances. Overgeneral classifiers advocate the desired action in some of the conditions
they match, but not all of them, so performance suffers in these states. The greedy
classifier problem occurs when the fitness of a classifier depends on to the magnitude
of the reward it receives. Rules which match in high reward parts of the environment
will reproduce often and there may not be enough rules that match low rewarding
states [35]. The overgeneral and greedy rule problems combine to create problematic
rules that are known as strong overgenerals. These rules act correctly in high reward
states and incorrectly in low reward states. Strong overgeneral rules are unreliable,
but outweigh reliable rules during action selection.
The problem concerns the generality versus specificity of rules. When a general
rule has a higher reward prediction than a specialized rule and both match a certain
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condition, a problem can arise. If the two rules have different actions, the one with
higher reward will be chosen. While the general rules will be chosen since it has
a higher reward prediction, the action proposed by the specialized rule may be the
better choice in certain conditions.
Solutions to the problem of overgenerals include fitness sharing techniques and
an accuracy-based fitness. Fitness sharing uses reward competition to eliminate
strong overgenerals. Some types of LCS use a fitness based on how accurate a rule can
predict its reward, and promotes those with a low variance. The strong overgeneral
problem shows the importance and challenge in defining the structure of the problem
to solve and the objective of the learning system.
6.5. STRENGTH-BASED AND ACCURACY-BASED FITNESS
In traditional strength-based learning classifier systems, a rule’s fitness is known
as its strength. The strength value is used in both action selection and reproduction.
XCS introduced a new method of using different values for action selection and re-
production.
In strength-based fitness, fitness is equal to strength and is the only value used
for action and parent selection. Strength is updated using reward from the environ-
ment as well as a learning rate constant.
In accuracy-based fitness, the strength parameter is still calculated using the
same method but it is also used to calculate other parameters used in reproduction
selection. Strength is also known as prediction, as it predicts the reward a rule will
receive when it is used in the system. The other parameters used in accuracy-based
fitness are based on the prediction value. Prediction error estimates the error of a
rule’s prediction value. The accuracy of a rule is based on an error threshold and
a rule is fully accurate if its error is below that threshold. Relative accuracies are
calculated for each rule in the action set. Fitness is updated to represent the average
of each rule’s relative accuracy.
6.6. ZCS
The Zeroth-Level Classifier system was originally proposed in [36]. The goal of
the system was to keep the original ideas of LCS but to make a simplified version of
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it, to increase its understandability as well as its performance. ZCS did not have the
shortcomings of the complexity of the original LCS, yet still had good results.
ZCS removed the internal message list and rule-bidding from the original LCS
framework, as well as removing unnecessary algorithmic components originally in-
troduced to improve performance of LCS [32]. Without a way to pass information
between iterations, ZCS’s rules depend on how the system interacts with the envi-
ronment. Each rule r in ZCS has three main components: r = (c : a→ s) where:
• c is the condition which represents the environmental state the rule matches
• a is the action which the rule advocates
• s is the cumulative credit a rule has received (strength)
In every cycle of ZCS, the match set is generated to contain all individuals that
match the current set of inputs of the environment. ZCS introduced the idea of using
action sets, groups of rules with the same action, instead of individual rules for action
selection and reinforcement. The match set is subdivided into action sets according to
the action each matching rule advocates. Action selection uses a fitness proportionate
selection, where fitness is the sum of the rules’ strength in each action set. Figure 6.1
shows the typical structure of ZCS.
Discovery in ZCS is caused by two mechanisms, an EA and a covering operator.
For each time-step, the EA has a certain probability of being invoked. It uses roulette
wheel selection to choose two parents based on their fitness and creates two offspring
using crossover and mutation. Rules are deleted to make room for children using
roulette wheel selection based on the inverse of their fitness.
The covering operator is used to create a new rule with a condition that matches
the current state of the environment when no rules in population match, or when the
match-set does not contain enough high quality rules.
The original credit assignment technique in LCS was the bucket brigade algo-
rithm (BBA). When ZCS was introduced, it introduced a new concept which merged
ideas from BBA along with the Q-learning strategy used in other reinforcement learn-
ing problems [37]. Strength in ZCS moves from each action to the previous action
set which rewards sequences of actions that gain reward from the environment. A
discounting factor is used to create a preference for shorter chains of actions.
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Figure 6.1: ZCS overview
The rules in the system are continually updated as new rules are created. Re-
ward is divided among rules in each action set and the EA acts globally across the
entire population, which creates fitness sharing among rules. This preserves environ-
mental niches, action sets, but the system only preserves the rules in each niche that
lead to maximum reward.
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7. EXTENDED CLASSIFIER SYSTEM (XCS)
One drawback of ZCS is that it does not evolve a complete mapping of the
environment from rules and their actions to received rewards, as well as recombining
rules from different niches [38]. The eXtended Classifier System (XCS) was created
to address these issues.
XCS addresses the problem of generalization by using a niche GA along with
population-wide deletion. The specific problem of strong overgenerals is solved by
changing fitness from a strength-based measurement to an accuracy-based one [33].
The new fitness is derived from the accuracy of reward prediction, instead of reward
prediction itself, hence the reason XCS is known as an accuracy-based LCS. Using
accuracy-based fitness enables XCS to evolve an accurate solution for all problem
instances as well as a complete and accurate mapping of solutions to rewards rather
than focusing only on high-payoff niches in the environment. Reinforcement learning
is also known for learning a function that maps a complete representation of the
state/action space, and XCS is known for successfully bridging the fields of LCS and
RL [32].
Figure 7.1 shows the typical structure of the XCS algorithm. In XCS, five main
components make up a rule along with additional parameters:
• Condition C represents the environmental state the rule matches
• Action A is the action which the rule advocates
• Reward prediction R estimates the average reward the rule has received
• Reward prediction error  estimates the error of the reward prediction
• Fitness F represents the relative accuracy of the rule
Reward prediction R is updated iteratively to represent a moving average mea-
sure of reward received by the environment. Fitness F is a function of prediction
accuracy instead of prediction magnitude and is scaled relative to other rules in each
environmental niche. An illustration of a rule is shown in Figure 7.2. Separating
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Figure 7.1: XCS overview
Figure 7.2: XCS rule representation
the credit assignment from the fitness used in evolution is one of the most import
innovations of XCS [32].
Rules in XCS include some additional parameters not present in the original
LCS:
• Action set size as estimates the average size of the action set a rule belongs to.
• Time stamp ts specifies when the rule was last included in evolution
• Experience counter exp keeps a record of how many parameter updates the rule
has received.
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• Numerosity num is used to combine multiple identical rules into one single rule,
and numerosity is the count of rules the macro-rule represents. This speeds up
computation time.
7.1. INITIALIZATION
XCS may start with either an empty population or a population of randomly
generated rules, which have a random condition and action. If the population is
empty, the covering operator creates a new rule for each problem instance that is not
covered by the current population of rules. The difference in these two methods is
studied in the results section. An advantage of initialization due to covering is that
the problem space is immediately covered [33].
Population initialization needs to provide a general population in order to pro-
vide enough time for evaluation and EA application [33]. If the population size is
too small or the initial population is over-specialized, this requirement is not met and
XCS does not perform optimally. Covering normally occurs briefly at the start of
a run until a population is established that covers all of the problem instances. If
rules’ conditions are too specific, XCS can get stuck in an infinite covering-random
deletion cycle [33]. This cycle is due to the population being of a fixed size, and
if the population is already full when covering is applied, a rule must be deleted to
make room for the covering rule. If coverage is continuously triggered, the system
will remove an individual, and evolutionary pressures do not have time to take affect.
7.2. EVALUATION
Rule evaluation is done every iteration and is detailed in [33]. The match set,
[M ], contains all rules that match the current problem instance. If the match set is
empty, the covering operator is applied. From the match set, a prediction array P (A)
is formed:
P (A) =
∀r ∈ [M ] ∑
r.A=A
r.R ∗ r.F





The prediction array is a fitness-weighted average of all reward predictions from
the rules in the match set that recommend action A. Action selection methods
for XCS are usually explore, randomly selecting an action found in [M ], or exploit,
deterministically choosing the best action within [M ]. Typical schemes alternate
between the two methods from one iteration to the next.
In classification problems, rules in action set [A] are immediately updated with
reward P from the environment. In single step problems P is equal to current reward,
while in RL problems it equals current reward plus a discounted future reward. Pa-
rameters are updated in this order: prediction error, prediction, fitness. The update
algorithm is very similar to Q-learning.
First, reward prediction error  for each rule in [A] is updated:
 = + β(|P −R| − ) (3)
Learning rate β controls accuracy and adaptivity of the moving average estima-
tion [33]. Next, reward prediction R for each rule in [A] is updated:
R = R + β(P −R) (4)
The fitness of each rule is based on a scaled relative accuracy κ′ which is calculated
as follows:
κ =









κ is an estimate of a rule’s accuracy that uses a power function with exponent ν to
prefer low error classifiers. Threshold 0 is a maximal error tolerance, and rules with
error below this threshold are considered accurate. Relative accuracy κ′ is scaled
with respect to the rules in [A]. This has the effect of fitness sharing, each rule in [A]
competes for a limited resource that is dependent on κ.
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The fitness F of each rule is finally updated:
F = F + β(κ′ − F ) (7)
Fitness represents the average, relative accuracy of a rule.
The action set size as is also updated in a similar way:
as = as+ β(|[A]| − as) (8)
Additionally, the reward prediction, prediction error, and action set size parameters
are updated using a moyenne adaptive modifie´e (adaptive average-based modification)
technique [33]. This method sets the parameter value directly to the average of the
values received thus far, if the experience of a classifier is less than 1/β.
7.3. EVOLUTION
Genetic reproduction in XCS is performed by a genetic algorithm which runs
on the current action set [A]. Evolution is performed if the average time since the
last EA application (stored in the timestamp parameter of all the rules in [A] exceeds
threshold θEA.
Two parents are selected using proportionate selection based on rules’ fitness.
Two offspring are created using crossover and mutation on the parents. Offspring
parameters are initialized by averaging the parent’s fitness F , prediction R, and
prediction error . The fitness F of offspring is decreased to 10%, being pessimistic
about the offspring [33]. Offspring are not assumed to have high fitness based on the
performance of their parents. Experience exp is set to 1.
If the population size is greater than the specified maximum, extra rules are
deleted with a probability proportional to their action set size parameter as. If a
rule has experience greater than threshold θdel and a fitness lower than a fraction
(parameter δ) of the average fitness F¯ of rules in the population, its probability of




The learning classifier system this thesis is based on is a variant of the XCS
model. It has been adapted for use in the problem domain of malware detection,
including replacing the bit string representation with s-expressions. An overview of
this learning classifier system is shown in Figure 8.1.
The training and test sets come from the pre-processing component of the sys-
tem. Once all the executables are analyzed and features are extracted, the learning
classifier system takes the feature list and evolves rules until a termination condition
is met.
8.1. LEARNING CLASSIFIER SYSTEM
8.1.1. Rule Representation. Traditional LCS and XCS implementa-
tions operate on bit-string representations of problems. These fixed-length bit-string
representations are not optimal for searching problem spaces which are described
symbolically or for problems with both syntactic and semantic constraints, which can
vary in length and complexity [27].
In this system the condition part of each rule is represented as an s-expression.
S-expressions can be visualized as a tree structure where internal nodes are one of the
logic operators {AND,OR,NOT} and leaf nodes (terminals) are a single feature (an
example is shown in Figure 8.2). S-expressions allow for more complex forms of logical
relationships to be expressed over bit-strings; it is an assumption of this research that
malicious files contain complex relationships of features that are identifiable from
non-malicious files.
Since malware detection is a binary classification problem, the action of each
rule represents whether the file is classified as malicious or not.
8.1.2. Initialization. There are three methods of rule initialization in this
system: random, covering, and from a C4.5 decision tree.
During random initialization, each tree is built from the top down. Every node
has a chance of becoming a function or terminal node, the operator rate parameter is
the probability of a node becoming a function node (operator). If it is, an operator
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Figure 8.1: Malware LCS Diagram
Figure 8.2: Visualization of a subtree of a generated rule
is randomly chosen from the list of operators, and the appropriate number of child
nodes are created in the same fashion. If a tree is at the maximum tree height, the
node becomes a terminal node.
Initialization due to covering creates a rule when the current population does
not match a presented file. This enables the system to develop a complete coverage
of the training set, and recombination will allow the rules to generalize the dataset.
While the covering operator is used exclusively in this technique, it also available in
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the other initialization methods; it is invoked if a problem instance is not matched
by any rules.
A third initialization technique is generation from a C4.5 decision tree. The
tree can be converted to a ruleset, similar to the method used in [15]. Each leaf node
in the decision tree becomes an individual rule in the population. The initial set of
rules fully represents the decision tree, but is in a format that can be evolved by the
learning classifier system. By starting with the knowledge of the C4.5 algorithm, the
initial population begins with a higher fitness and accuracy.
8.1.3. Action Selection. A single problem instance in this system is a
randomly chosen file that is presented to the system. Each rule in the population is
a parse tree, and is compared to the extracted features from the file. If the parse tree
matches the feature, it is put into the LCS’s match set. If no rules match a given
malicious file during training, a covering operator creates a rule that has a matching
condition and inserts it into the population with a chance of spreading its genetic
material to offspring, allowing the population to classify the file. From the match set,
an action is chosen.
There are various methods of choosing an action, and XCS typically alternates
between two methods in an explore/exploit scheme [32]. Explore randomly selects an
action from within the action set, while exploit deterministically selects the action
with the highest reward. Once an action is chosen, the action set becomes the rules
in the match set that advocate the chosen action. The evolutionary algorithm is only
run during exploration and the fitness of rules is only evaluated during exploitation.
As seen in the system diagram in Figure 8.1, exploration combines the perfor-
mance component with the discovery component. New rules are created by the EA
and the system explores the search space in hopes of finding better rules.
Exploitation combines the performance component with the reinforcement com-
ponent. The action with the highest reward is chosen and the rules are rewarded if
the action was correct and punished if it was incorrect. Exploitation reinforces rules
that receive reward and evaluates the rules discovered during exploration.
This combination of methods allows the system to explore a large search space
while rewarding rules that lead to environmental reward. By alternating between the
two methods, the system spends equal amounts of time discovering and reinforcing,
thus creating a balance between the two.
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8.1.4. Rule Evaluation. The rules in the action set are updated every
iteration with reward from the environment. In the classification problem of malware
detection, environment feedback is immediate and based on whether the action selec-
tion was correct. In XCS, the RL technique is based on the Q-learning algorithm [39].
Three parameters are adjusted to determine the performance of a rule, in the order:
prediction error, prediction, fitness [33].
A feature is considered malicious or benign based on whether the file it was ex-
tracted from was identified as malicious or benign. It is important to realize that not
all features of a malicious file are themselves malicious; many malicious files have be-
nign actions and there is an overlap between the sets of benign features and malicious
features. Reward is based on whether the chosen action matches the classification of
the file.
8.1.5. Mutation. Mutation introduces random variation to individuals by
selecting a random mutation point. The subtree rooted at that node is replaced with
a randomly generated tree. The height of the generated subtree is limited so the
entire tree does not exceed the maxheight parameter, in order to keep processing
time from growing indefinitely. The terminal nodes were chosen using proportionate
selection from the vector of features extracted from the training set. Features were
chosen using roulette-wheel selection, with a probability proportional to the number
of times a feature appeared in the training set.
8.1.6. Crossover. Crossover works similar to that in Genetic Programming.
A subtree starting at a random node is chosen from each parent, and the subtree
from one parent replaces the subtree from the other parent.
While crossover of individuals represented by bit strings typically produces two
offspring, subtree crossover in genetic programming normally produces a single child.
While subtree crossover can produce two offspring, it is not commonly used [40]. The
effects of the number of children produced is studied in the results section.
During recombination the second parent’s random node selection was limited
to those nodes which would keep the heights of the offspring below the maxheight
parameter.
8.1.7. Evolutionary Algorithm. In XCS, the EA reproduces rules in the
action set, realizing implicit niching [41] as opposed to panmictic reproduction, where
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rules are selected from the entire population. XCS performs genetic reproduction if
the average time since the last EA invocation of the rules in the action set exceeds
threshold θEA.
The mechanism used for parent and survivor selection is tournament selection.
Parent selection chooses a set of classifiers at random, and the one with the highest
fitness is chosen to become a parent. In XCS an effective method for determining
parent tournament size is to make it proportional to action set size [33]. Parameter
τ represents the proportion of the action set that is used in the tournament. Since
the EA acts on individuals in the action set, selective pressure is based on the size
of the action set. If selection pressure is too weak, learning may not take place
and if selection pressure is too strong, crossover never has any effect since identical
individuals are crossed [33]. Survivor selection repeatedly executes a tournament of a
user specified size and deletes the least fit until the population size has been reduced
to its specified size. An age requirement has to be met before rules are considered for
parent and survival selection; a rule is not eligible for selection until the system has
presented it with θage files.
8.2. DECISION TREE INITIALIZATION
8.2.1. C4.5 rule initialization. One of the additions to traditional XCS
that this system includes is an initialization operator that takes a decision tree and
generates a corresponding ruleset. This enables the system to start with knowledge
about the problem and quickly narrow in on some of the optima in the problem space.
These may be local optima that the decision tree has found, and as with any EA, the
LCS faces challenges in finding the global optimum.
Each leaf node in the decision tree becomes a single rule in the LCS. There
is a one-to-one correspondence of leaf nodes and rules. This initialization method
combines the decision tree’s quick run-time with the benefits of an adaptive, evolving
ruleset. This approach quickly guides the LCS in the direction of high performing
rules, with hopes of evolving an even better population of rules. A potential downside
of this method is that the rules generated from C4.5 may guide the evolution process
towards a sub-optimal solution because C4.5 may overfit to the training instances.
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8.2.2. Specialization function. The number of rules generated from a
decision tree is equal to the number of nodes in that tree. The population size of
the LCS is static, and there may be space in the population for more rules than the
decision tree contained. An additional variation function was created for decision
tree initialization. The set of rules the decision tree created is specialized by adding
additional features to the tree condition of each rule. This allows a single rule from
the decision tree to be modified multiple times and inserted into the LCS population.
A subtree is generated and appended to the original decision tree rule. The
height of this subtree is controlled by the parameter SpecializationHeight. This
parameter controls how specialized the rule becomes, and the smaller it is, the closer
the specialized rule is to the original node in the decision tree.
8.3. PERFORMANCE METRICS
The goal of this system is to evolve rules using RL that will identify malware.
The pre-processing step first extracts features from the files and this collection of
features is divided into training and testing sets. The LCS evolved rules over the
training set, then evaluated them over the testing set.
Experiments were run using a stratified ten-fold cross-validation test. Each fold
contained 50% malware and 50% goodware.
A rule’s classification accuracy on a file maps to one of the following four cate-
gories:
1. True positive (TP): correctly classifies a malicious executable as malicious.
2. False negative (FN): incorrectly classifies a malicious executable as non-malicious.
3. True negative (TN): correctly classifies a non-malicious executable as non-
malicious.
4. False positive (FP): incorrectly classifies a non-malicious executable as mali-
cious.
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Three different metrics were tracked: (1) Classification Accuracy, (2) Detection
Rate (DR), and (3) False Alarm Rate (FAR). These are defined mathematically as:
classification accuracy =
TP + TN










The classification accuracy rates how the system performs in general, while detection
rate and false alarm rate show more specific metrics on the trade-offs between malware
coverage and false positives.
8.4. DEFAULT PARAMETERS
A list of default parameters the LCS uses in the experiments described in Sec-
tion 9, unless otherwise specified, is presented in Table 8.1. There are parameters
that relate to the EA, the LCS, and the individual rules.
A description of each parameter is provided next. More details on how the XCS
parameters are used are described in Section 7; the core set of these parameters are
the same ones as used in [33] with additional system-specific parameters.
• Population Size (µ) - Number of rules in the population
• Crossover Rate (χ) - Chance of using crossover to produce offspring
• Mutation Rate - Chance of using mutation to produce offspring
• Offspring Size (λ) - Number of offspring created per invocation of the EA
• Survivor Tournament Size - Number of individuals used in the tournament for
deleting excess rules
• Accuracy Parameter (α) - Accuracy power function coefficient; differentiates
accurate from inaccurate rules
• Accuracy Parameter (ν) - Accuracy power function exponent; controls the rate
of decrease of a rule’s accuracy as a function of its prediction error 
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Table 8.1: Classifier system parameters
Parameter Name Parameter Value
EA parameters
Population Size (µ) 400
Crossover Rate (χ) 1.0
Mutation Rate 0.04
Offspring Size (λ) 1
Survivor Tournament Size 5
XCS parameters
Accuracy Parameter (α) 0.1
Accuracy Parameter (ν) 5.0
Error Threshold (0) 10
Learning Rate (β) 0.2
Parent Tournament Proportion (τ) 0.5
EA Threshold (θEA) 45
Fitness Parameter (δ) 0.1
Deletion Threshold (θdel) 20
Rule parameters
Initial Tree Height 5
Max Tree Height 8




• Error Threshold (0) - Threshold of maximal error tolerance; provides a toler-
ance of noise
• Learning Rate (β) - Controls the balance between new information and old
information; a large β results in a large change in the parameter estimate, while
a small β results in a small change
• Parent Tournament Proportion (τ) - Proportion of the current action set that is
used for tournament selection by the EA; this ensures relatively strong selection
pressure, adapting to the current action set size
• EA Threshold (θEA) - Frequency of the EA application
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• Fitness Parameter (δ) - Fraction of mean fitness of the population; if a rule has
a lower fitness, its deletion probability is increased
• Deletion Threshold (θdel) - Minimum experience threshold for fitness influence
in deletion
• Initial Tree Height - Maximum size of a rule’s condition during initialization
• Max Tree Height - Maximum of a rule’s condition during mutation and crossover
• Operators - The list of operators available for internal nodes of a rule’s condition
• Operator Rate - The probability of choosing an operator at any given node in
a tree
• Import Rate - The probability of choosing an import (versus a section) for a
given leaf node




Various datasets were analyzed and compared using different techniques, ini-
tializations, and parameters. All experiments were run using a stratified ten-fold
cross-validation test. Each fold contained the same amount of malicious files (50%)
and non-malicious files (50%).
9.1. FAMILY OF MALWARE STUDY
In order to determine the effectiveness of the custom LCS system, a small dataset
was used in this experiment. The dataset consisted of malicious files all belonging
to a family of malware known as Poison Ivy. Three initialization methods were used
in this experiment: random initialization, covering initialization, and initialization
from C4.5 decision trees. The C4.5 algorithm itself was used as a baseline for perfor-
mance comparison. The four different results are compared and discussed for various
population sizes.
For random initialization, each rule was randomly generated using the grow
algorithm. For covering initialization, the population started empty, and rules were
created for each file that was presented and not covered by the current set of rules.
With C4.5 initialization, rules were taken from a generated C4.5 decision tree and
then modified using the specialization function.
Population size was adjusted to determine how it affects accuracy as well as
the minimal number of rules required to accurately classify the dataset. The dataset
consisted of 50 files, and was divided into 10 folds for stratified cross validation, each
fold has the same number of non-malicious files and malicious files so that each test
set has identical distributions of malware and goodware.
The results are presented in groups based on what parameter was changed be-
tween runs. For each population size, the three initialization methods are compared.
Figure 9.1 shows results from using a population size of 10. A population size of
10 was too small for this dataset as evident in the figures, no convergence was achieved.
The system had entered a covering-random deletion loop as described earlier. The
population size was too small to adequately cover the entire set of files, so as the
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(a) covering initialization (b) random initialization
(c) C4.5 initialization
Figure 9.1: Malware family results using population size=10
algorithm created rules to cover problem instances, it had to delete a rule already in
the population, and the deleted rule created a new gap that had to be covered on
the next round of file presentations. The large variance in both training and testing
accuracies show the system thrashing through new individuals, unable to keep high
performers in the population. The system can not cover the entire dataset, only a
window of it, and as that window continuously shifts around, the performance does
as well. The C4.5 initialization test started with a population of high fitness, but as
it made room for offspring, it deleted some high performing rules and performance
suffered as the system dropped into the same random cycle as the other methods.
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(a) covering initialization (b) random initialization
(c) C4.5 initialization
Figure 9.2: Malware family results using population size=20
Figure 9.2 shows results from using a population size of 20. This size population
does better than the previous experiment, as there is a lot less variance and an
increasing trend can be seen in the graphs. The performance is not quite optimal,
as there still is some variation in the performance. Although the problem space was
adequately covered, there were not enough individuals in the population to smooth
out the performance of the system on the harder to classify instances.
Figure 9.3 shows results from using a population size of 30. This experiment
had the best results, and could accurately represent the training set. The overall
best accuracy the system achieved was 99.6% training and 94.0% testing using rule
generation from the C4.5 decision tree with a population of 30. Closely following
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(a) covering initialization (b) random initialization
(c) C4.5 initialization
Figure 9.3: Malware family results using population size=30
was random initialization with 98.6% training and 92.0% testing. This experiment
had a relatively small search space and the LCS was able to evolve rules that were
competitive with those starting from C4.5.
Table 9.1 shows the averages and standard deviations from all runs in this exper-
iment. Two-sample F-tests for equal variances and corresponding two-tailed t-tests
using α = 0.05 were employed to compare results. Not all results were statistically
significant. The p values for some tests were small enough to reject the null hypothesis
that the data between two runs are independent random samples from normal distri-
butions with equal means and equal but unknown variances. Significant conclusions
from the testing results can be made as follows:
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• All methods improved by increasing the population size from 10 to 20.
• C4.5 initialization improved by increasing the population from 10 to 20.
• C4.5 initialization performed better than random initialization at population
size of 20.
• C4.5 initialization performed better than covering initialization for population
sizes of 10 and 20.
• At a population size of 10, no LCS method had a significant advantage over any
other.
• The C4.5 decision tree performed better than all other methods at a population
size of 10.
• The C4.5 decision tree performed better than covering and random initialization
at a population sizes of 20.
• The C4.5 decision tree did not perform significantly better than any LCS
method at a population size of 30.
• The overall best training method was C4.5 initialization with population size
of 20.
The C4.5 algorithm was ran on the dataset and achieved 98.0% training accuracy
and 96.0% testing accuracy, better than the LCS at small population sizes. At a large
enough population, the LCS performed comparably to C4.5. The best performing
initialization method was initializing with rules generated from the C4.5 decision tree;
showing that seeding the algorithm with prior knowledge about the data allowed it
to perform better than starting at random locations in the search space.
Better tuning of the LCS may enhance its performance as well as evolving it
for longer periods of time. While the decision tree was able to accurately classify
this small dataset, as shown in the benchmark it does not perform as well on more
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Table 9.1: Family of malware study experimental results
Dataset Initialization µ System Accuracy DR FAR
Training
Covering
10 0.727(0.141) 0.685(0.356) 0.242(0.263)
20 0.909(0.077) 0.814(0.197) 0.032(0.075)
30 0.964(0.064) 0.937(0.146) 0.017(0.053)
Random
10 0.805(0.127) 0.595(0.375) 0.056(0.097)
20 0.918(0.085) 0.899(0.138) 0.068(0.090)
30 0.986(0.031) 0.980(0.043) 0.009(0.029)
C4.5
10 0.855(0.123) 0.878(0.270) 0.174(0.169)
20 0.996(0.014) 0.991(0.029) 0.000(0.000)
30 0.986(0.031) 1.000(0.000) 0.022(0.051)
Decision Tree n/a 0.980(0.007) 0.955(0.024) 0.004(0.012)
Testing
Covering
10 0.640(0.126) 0.450(0.438) 0.233(0.316)
20 0.760(0.207) 0.600(0.516) 0.133(0.172)
30 0.920(0.140) 0.800(0.350) 0.000(0.000)
Random
10 0.780(0.175) 0.500(0.471) 0.033(0.105)
20 0.800(0.211) 0.700(0.422) 0.133(0.172)
30 0.920(0.140) 0.850(0.337) 0.033(0.105)
C4.5
10 0.800(0.163) 0.800(0.422) 0.200(0.233)
20 0.940(0.097) 0.900(0.211) 0.033(0.105)
30 0.940(0.097) 0.900(0.211) 0.033(0.105)
Decision Tree n/a 0.960(0.084) 0.900(0.211) 0.000(0.000)
diverse datasets. The next section analyzes how the two algorithms perform on a
larger dataset consisting of many types of malware.
9.2. BENCHMARK DATASET COMPARISON
The family of malware dataset is an unrealistic representation of an actual
malware detection system, which has to identify threats of all kinds, not just a single
type of malware. This experiment tested the algorithms on the larger, more diverse
dataset used for the benchmarking baseline set up in Section 4. The dataset size was
300 files and used a stratified ten-fold cross-validation test.
9.2.1. Initialization method study. For the first part of the experiment,
similar tests to those run in the family of malware study were run to analyze how the
algorithms performed on a larger and more difficult dataset. This includes adjusting
the population size as well as the initialization method. The resulting means and
standard deviations are shown in Table 9.2.
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Table 9.2: Initialization study experimental results
Dataset Initialization µ System Accuracy DR FAR
Training
Covering
50 0.837(0.048) 0.887(0.073) 0.214(0.047)
100 0.830(0.040) 0.866(0.093) 0.210(0.103)
200 0.907(0.022) 0.926(0.029) 0.112(0.031)
300 0.905(0.030) 0.940(0.023) 0.127(0.056)
Random
50 0.796(0.036) 0.865(0.093) 0.274(0.063)
100 0.841(0.040) 0.879(0.055) 0.197(0.060)
200 0.852(0.029) 0.921(0.044) 0.216(0.055)
300 0.889(0.028) 0.924(0.049) 0.148(0.037)
C4.5
50 0.897(0.020) 0.945(0.031) 0.151(0.049)
100 0.927(0.015) 0.971(0.031) 0.117(0.043)
200 0.962(0.013) 0.978(0.016) 0.056(0.026)
300 0.963(0.020) 0.987(0.015) 0.061(0.033)
Decision Tree n/a 0.948(0.008) 0.973(0.009) 0.077(0.015)
Testing
Covering
50 0.790(0.092) 0.840(0.155) 0.260(0.119)
100 0.803(0.053) 0.873(0.106) 0.267(0.144)
200 0.813(0.063) 0.833(0.072) 0.207(0.091)
300 0.783(0.071) 0.807(0.139) 0.240(0.078)
Random
50 0.743(0.108) 0.820(0.281) 0.333(0.220)
100 0.780(0.101) 0.807(0.219) 0.247(0.141)
200 0.813(0.061) 0.873(0.097) 0.247(0.118)
300 0.833(0.074) 0.873(0.119) 0.207(0.135)
C4.5
50 0.800(0.061) 0.840(0.134) 0.240(0.110)
100 0.803(0.051) 0.887(0.077) 0.280(0.125)
200 0.797(0.060) 0.847(0.063) 0.253(0.133)
300 0.790(0.072) 0.847(0.083) 0.267(0.141)
Decision Tree n/a 0.797(0.058) 0.847(0.083) 0.253(0.147)
Two-sample F-tests for equal variances and corresponding two-tailed t-tests us-
ing α = 0.05 were employed to compare results. Not all results were statistically
significant. The p values for some tests were small enough to reject the null hypoth-
esis. These following significant conclusions can be made from the training results:
• Covering initialization performed better than random initialization at popula-
tion sizes of 50 and 200.
• Covering initialization performed better at a population size of 200 over 100.
• Random initialization performed best on a population size of 300
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• C4.5 initialization performed better than random initialization on all popula-
tion sizes.
• C4.5 initialization performed better than covering initialization on all popula-
tion sizes except at 300.
• C4.5 initialization performed increasingly better on each population size in-
crease except for 300.
• The C4.5 decision tree did not perform significantly better than any tuned LCS
method.
Initialization from C4.5 obtained the best system performance and this is most
likely due to the fact that the system started with prior knowledge and had a coverage
of the problem space from the beginning.
9.2.2. Population size study. The data in Table 9.2 is grouped by
initialization method, but it can also be analyzed by population size. In the second
part of this experiment, a graph was generated for each initialization method and
plotted according to population size. The training accuracies of all three methods
using 4 different population sizes can be seen in Figure 9.4, and testing results in
Figure 9.5.
As the population size increased, there was a general trend of increased training
accuracy in each method. Testing accuracies did not exhibit the same trend. While
the random initialization method has a slight increase in accuracy, it is not statistically
significant. A larger population allowed the classifier system to create more rules,
which enabled the system to accurately classify more of the training set but not of
the testing set.
Increasing the population size will not necessarily make the system test perfor-
mance better, as well as having the disadvantages of making the system harder for a
human to interpret and slowing down the speed of the system, as more calculations
are required.
9.2.3. Offspring size study. The third part of the experiment analyzed how
adjusting the number of offspring produced affected the performance of the system.
The same benchmarking dataset is used as before.
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(a) C4.5 initialization (b) Random initialization
(c) Covering Initialization
Figure 9.4: Population size training results
In genetic programming one or two offspring can be created from the crossover
operation. The more common method is to produce a single offspring per evolution
cycle [40]. This test compared the differences between creating one and two offspring
per invocation of the evolutionary algorithm. As the reader will recall, the EA is
invoked based on the average time since it was last ran, so there is no set number
of children or EA applications for a given number of problem instances. Averages
and standard deviations are shown in Table 9.3. Changing offspring size did not
have a major affect on performance. Whether one individual or two were created,
evolutionary pressures still applied in the same manner.
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(a) C4.5 initialization (b) Random initialization
(c) Covering Initialization
Figure 9.5: Population size testing results
9.3. SYSTEM COMPARISON TO C4.5 DECISION TREE
The datasets in these experiments came from the Offensive Computing collec-
tion, which contains user-submitted malware. The malware in this set is of unknown
origin and could belong to any family, unlike the previous experiment. There is no
known relationship between any two malicious files. This is an accurate representa-
tion of the real world, where internet users are potentially exposed to every file on
the internet and may encounter any number of threats.
C4.5 was ran on the dataset using the orange machine learning framework [28].
The high-level structure of a decision tree is shown in Figure 9.6 and it is highly
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Table 9.3: Offspring size study experimental results
Dataset λ µ System Accuracy DR FAR
Training
1
50 0.837(0.048) 0.887(0.073) 0.214(0.047)
100 0.830(0.040) 0.866(0.093) 0.210(0.103)
200 0.907(0.022) 0.926(0.029) 0.112(0.031
300 0.909(0.030) 0.939(0.048) 0.119(0.057)
2
50 0.821(0.035) 0.891(0.054) 0.248(0.046)
100 0.848(0.020) 0.901(0.066) 0.204(0.057)
200 0.888(0.032) 0.949(0.029) 0.169(0.072)
300 0.918(0.023) 0.962(0.036) 0.126(0.048)
Testing
1
50 0.790(0.092) 0.840(0.155) 0.260(0.119)
100 0.803(0.053) 0.873(0.106) 0.267(0.144)
200 0.813(0.063) 0.833(0.072) 0.207(0.091)
300 0.820(0.083) 0.873(0.106) 0.233(0.151)
2
50 0.770(0.068) 0.827(0.167) 0.287(0.154)
100 0.813(0.095) 0.866(0.154) 0.240(0.181)
200 0.833(0.074) 0.907(0.064) 0.240(0.134)
300 0.810(0.063) 0.900(0.065) 0.280(0.150)
unbalanced. In this tree, almost all subtrees have a leaf node as one of their children.
Very few leaf nodes are at the same depth, and there is only a single path to the
maximum depth of the tree. This structure results from the sparseness of the dataset.
The dataset consists of many attributes but any given problem instance contains only
a few of those attributes; at each level the decision tree was able to separate a few
files from the remaining group. This resulted in a lopsided tree that has a large height
and a relatively small node count.
The number of possible nodes in a tree is exponentially related to its height:
2height + 1 − 1. The search space of a tree producing algorithm greatly increases with
tree height. The large search space of the learning classifier system is countered by
the fact the each problem instance in the LCS may be matched by more than one
rule, while in C4.5 each problem only matches a single leaf node. C4.5 uses a different
technique to define its nodes than the LCS does for defining its rules. The LCS is able
to adapt its action selection based on rule performance and delete poorly performing
rules.
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Figure 9.6: Visualization of an unbalanced C4.5 decision tree
A comparison of the C4.5 algorithm to the LCS is presented in Figure 9.7.
Training and testing accuracies are shown for each of the three initialization methods
as well as the original decision tree results. Each initialization method was tuned for
population size, and the figure represents the best testing accuracy obtained for each
method.
An important observation is that C4.5 outperformed the LCS on training accu-
racy, but the reverse was true for testing. This shows that the C4.5 algorithm was
able to create a more accurate representation of the training set, but could not gener-
alize as well on the testing set. In malware detection, known examples are useful for
benchmarking and training, but they are not a realistic representation of real world
data as they have already been classified. Detection of unknown threats is key to a
malware detection system, and the testing procedure simulates the system encoun-
tering previously unseen files. Although C4.5 may do better on training, it appears
to overfit compared to the LCS. Overfitting indicates that the system’s learning is
specific to the structure of the training set and generalization is not optimal.
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Figure 9.7: C4.5 and LCS comparison
An interesting observation is that as each testing results improved across each
method, training accuracy worsened. This is characteristic of overfitting, and is most
likely related to the specificity of the rules. C4.5 generates specific rules and trains to
a high rate, and the LCS based on those classifications has similar performance, but is
slightly more general. The LCS initialized by covering generates rules specifically for
training instances, but then generalizes them through mutation and recombination.
The initialization method that showed the greatest generalization was random, and
it follows from creating the least specific rules. The other methods use the training
instances for rule generation and these rules are not as general.
One of the learning classifier system’s advantages over C4.5 is its ability to
adapt and evolve the population of classifiers. The decision tree is static and cannot
adapt to new instances without being re-run over the entire dataset. Visualizing the
performance of the system over time, Figure 9.8 shows how the adaptive algorithm
starts with an initially poor performance and continuously improves in its ability to
classify. Results show that the training performance of the LCS never quite reaches
that of C4.5. This helps illustrate the importance of generalization: if an algorithm
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Figure 9.8: LCS evolution compared to C4.5
learns too specifically on the training set, it is said to be overfit, and performance on
the test set suffers. An ideal algorithm would be able to train to 100% accuracy and
have perfect generalization to any test set.
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10. CONCLUSION
This thesis presents an adaptive rule-based malware detection system employ-
ing a learning classifier system (LCS). It combines a rule-based expert system with
evolutionary algorithm (EA) based reinforcement learning, creating a self-training
adaptive malware detection system which dynamically evolves detection rules. The
LCS was extended from XCS to use s-expressions for the rule’s condition. Promising
results are shown, although their accuracy has to be further improved to be compet-
itive with the state-of-the-art. Evidence for the feasibility of using an LCS to evolve
malware detection rules is provided. With more features, additional aspects of PE
files could be analyzed, which may be expected to enhance detection rates and lower
false alarm rates.
The dataset included malware samples from Offensive Computing and non-
malicious samples from Windows computers. The set of known malicious and non-
malicious files were processed to confirm their maliciousness and features were ex-
tracted to be used for rule conditions.
A benchmark for comparing machine learning techniques is presented and the
decision tree algorithm C4.5 is used as a performance baseline. Under certain condi-
tions, the system was shown to outperform C4.5 on diverse datasets as well as being
better at generalization. Experimental results demonstrate the system’s ability to
evolve effective rules based on a training set, and its ability to generalize to previ-
ously unseen samples contained in a test set. The LCS did not suffer from the feature
dimension limitation of C4.5 mentioned in Section 4.5.
Various parameters were compared and the system trained best on multiple
datasets with a higher population size, but training performance was dependent on
the dataset as well as other problem specifics. No distinct overfitting curve was seen;
this is most likely due to a high amount of noise in the dataset. While training and
testing accuracies are linked, increasing training performance can negatively affect
testing if rules become too specialized.
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11. FUTURE WORK
Future work includes using a binary string representation, the more common
representation of a condition in an LCS. Bit strings are composed of zeros, ones, and
“don’t-care” symbols. The s-expressions used in this work allow for other kinds of
logical relationships to be expressed, using the logical operator OR. The typical bit-
string uses different forms of crossover and mutation, and this would have an affect
on evolution. Bit-strings are also trivial to check for subsumption between two rules.
If one condition logically subsumes another, it is possible to prevent offspring from
being added to the population that are subsumed by experienced individuals already
in the population. This operator could be added for s-expressions, but would require
significantly more computation time to compare two individuals.
Genetic programming utilizes different genetic operators than EAs employing
binary representations, and the subtle differences between the two should be studied.
Customizing the system to use fuzzy rules could help the system generalize better, and
creating a fuzzy LCS would allow for features to be defined abstractly. A comparison
between a Michigan style and a Pittsburgh style LCS would be useful to determine
how changing the unit the EA operates on, from a single rule to a ruleset, affects the
evolution and performance of the system.
Subtree comparison would reduce the processing time of the system. By evalu-
ating subtrees of individuals, results could be cached on the subtree level instead of
on the individual level, and fitness evaluation computation time would be decreased.
Subtree comparisons could also be used to reduce tree complexity by eliminating
redundant parts of each condition.
Extracting more features from PE files would allow for a better approximation
of the problem; it would create an environment more realistic of the real world but
would also expand the search space the algorithm is required to search. With more
genetic material available, the total number of possible conditions would increase and
this would have an effect on how the algorithm performs. An assumption made by
this research is that malicious files are identifiable by their extracted features, and
the more features available, the more reasonable this assumption becomes.
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The current system extracts static features from the files stored on disk, and is
a purely static analysis approach. By utilizing dynamic analysis, additional features
could be obtained from running the executables. Dynamic analysis could enhance
the abilities of the system, but would also require careful environmental setup, as
malicious code would be executing.
Additional comparisons to machine learning techniques would provide further
insight into how well evolutionary techniques perform versus alternatives. C5.0 has
multiple improvements over C4.5 (e.g., shorter run-time, smaller decision trees) and
is expected to have better performance than C4.5 [42]. Random forest is another
classification technique that builds classification (decision) trees, but this technique
is also known to be prone to overfitting [43]. Comparing these algorithms to the LCS
on the benchmark malware dataset would show the advantages and disadvantages of
different machine learning techniques.
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